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Egypt is the most populous Arab country with, as of December 
2015, 90.2 million inhabitants. Not surprisingly, it is the largest 
migrant sending country in the region to date. After a phase of 
legal restrictions on emigration under Nasser’s regime, Egyptian 
emigration took off after 1971. The economy and national borders 
were opened to the circulation of goods and persons (infitah) under 
President Sadat. The right to migrate is enshrined in the 1971 
Constitution. The 1973 War and the ensuing hike in oil prices having 
stimulated strong work force needs in oil-producing countries, large 
numbers of emigrants left Egypt for Saudi Arabia and the other Gulf 
states, to Iraq as well as to Libya.
During the 1980s and 1990s, Egypt went through several phases 
of migration ebbs and flows, especially to the Gulf and other Arab 
States, the main outlet for Egyptian migrants. During the 1980s, the 
Gulf States enacted a policy of replacing the Arab work force with 
Asian labourers. The First Gulf War of 1990-91 forced all Egyptian 
workers out of Iraq, as Egypt sided with the west against the Iraqi 
invasion of Kuwait. Many of these workers were redirected to Libya 
and to Saudi Arabia. Between 2003 and 2008, migration to the Gulf 
was sustained by high oil prices. Since 2011, however, and in spite of 
a new hike in hydrocarbon prices that ended in 2014, political events 
have affected Egyptian migration patterns. 
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The Arab uprisings spurred new policies of workforce 
indigenisation in Gulf countries (Saudisation, 
Kuwaitisation, ..); fear of political activism from 
citizens of new Arab regimes became stronger; and 
several campaigns targeted irregular migrants, many 
of whom were Egyptian. Meanwhile, the escalation 
of the war in Libya and especially the attacks against 
Egyptians there led the Foreign Ministry of Egypt 
to declare a ban on travel to Libya in September 
2014. However, economic necessity compelled 
some Egyptian workers to stay in the country. Their 
numbers today (late 2015) are difficult to establish, 
since many of them are undocumented.1
Migration flows to Europe, and especially to Italy, 
increased over the 2000s and peaked in 2010: there 
were 30,816 new permits holders for all of Europe and 
21,532 for Italy. The financial crisis of 2008, however, 
decreased the labour opportunities there and in 
Europe in general. Irregular sojourn and labour 
are, therefore, becoming increasingly frequent and 
this has been compounded by a post-revolutionary 
economic slowdown. This has increased migration 
pressure and popular demands for employment. An 
IOM survey reveals that employment, corruption, 
security, wages and constitutional reforms are the 
most important issue for young Egyptians after the 
events of 25 January 2011. Yet, around 70 percent 
of employed respondents had troubles with work 
after the uprisings. Thirty percent lost their jobs 
and a quarter were sent on forced and unpaid leave: 
naturally adding still further to migration pressure.2 
Unemployment and over qualification, added to 
a lack of confidence in Egypt’s stability, also drove 
migration from Egypt in a survey conducted in 
2013.3
Following the revolution in 2011, the short-
lived new 2012 Constitution was amended and 
replaced by the January 2014 Constitution. While 
constitutional guarantees such as the right of entry 
and exit for Egyptian citizens were stipulated in 
the 1971 Constitution and reiterated in 2014 (Art. 
62), the new text introduced rights and protections 
for Egyptians living abroad. Among these were the 
right to vote from abroad (art. 208), and the right 
of expatriates to be represented in the House of 
Representatives (art. 244). 
In terms of immigration, Egypt is host to limited 
flows of migrant workers, but rising numbers of 
refugees and asylum seekers. In addition to some 
70,000 Palestinian refugees, whose families arrived 
in 1948 and after, tens of thousands of refugees from 
Sudan, Ethiopia, Eritrea and Somalia, as well as 
Iraq and most recently, Syria, are now stranded in 
Egypt. These have been joined by transit migrants 
fleeing the war in Libya. Egypt adopted several legal 
provisions such as the acknowledgement of political 
asylum, in the new Constitution. The most recent 
initiative is the approval by the Egyptian Cabinet of 
a new anti-human smuggling law on 27 November 
2015. The law is in line with international standards, 
safeguarding the rights and addressing the needs of 
smuggled migrants. 
However, given Egypt’s dire economic situation, 
most migrants join migrating Egyptian citizens 
and risk their lives in trying to reach Europe by 
sea, in journeys that begin on the Egyptian coast. 
Countering illegal emigration, by land but especially 
by sea has become a major challenge for Egyptian 
authorities: under pressure of European neighbours. 
With police violence and even killings,4 crackdowns 
on irregular migrants have multiplied. During 
2015, thousands were captured and detained by the 
Egyptian police.5
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As of late 2013, an estimated 4.3 million 
Egyptians were living abroad. The vast majority 
of Egyptian expatriates resided in Arab countries 
(86 percent), many in Saudi Arabia (around 1.3 
million). Despite the political instability in the 
country, about 700,000 Egyptians continued 
to seek livelihoods in Libya, down from an 
estimated 1 to 2 million before the revolution.6 
Undocumented workers were many among 
Egyptians migrants to Libya, as well as to Jordan 
and to Saudi Arabia.
Stock
In 2006 (last available data), according to census 
figures, 184,070 foreign nationals resided in 
Egypt, or 0.3% of the total population. They came 
mainly from Arab (43 percent) and European (32 
percent) countries. 
In 2013, 15,655 foreign residents held a labour 
permit, 94 percent of them employed in the 
private and investment sector. Arabs, Europeans 
and Asians each made up about a third of the 
foreign work force in the sector, with Palestinians 
constituting the largest group (15 percent of all 
foreign workers and 55 percent of Arabs).18 
Bangladeshis and Indians made up respectively 
37 and 26 percent of all Asian workers. Most 
foreign workers (4,053) were in the “Legislators, 
senior officials and managers” occupational 
category (28 percent of all foreigners employed 
in the private sector in 2013), followed by the 
“Technicians and associate professionals” and the 
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Pinpointing the profile of Egyptian migrants 
is a challenge, even if studies acknowledge that 
in general, Egyptian emigrants are most often 
young men belonging to rural rather than urban 
areas.7 Their educational and occupational levels, 
however, differ by country of destination.
In Libya, as well as in Jordan, Egyptian workers 
are often employed in low-skilled professions, 
in the agriculture, construction and services 
sectors. Ninety-eight percent of Egyptian labour 
permit holders registered in Jordan in 2014 were 
employed in agricultural and in services- and 
production-related professions.8
In the Gulf States, and especially in Saudi Arabia 
where most Egyptians are hosted, documented 
labourers are often employed in white-collar, 
skilled and semi-skilled technical fields such 
as accountancy and marketing, for instance, in 
addition to agriculture and husbandry.9
Most Egyptians in the Gulf are male workers. Data 
for Kuwait, for instance, reveal that 77 percent of 
Egyptian residing in the country are males (335 
men for 100 women). Only twenty-eight percent 
of Egyptians are registered as family dependents. 
Income and skill levels determine the right to 
family reunion in every Gulf country. The small 
share of dependents among Egyptian residents 
in Kuwait confirms that these nationals occupy 
professions in an intermediate income bracket, 
which offers only limited possibilities for family 
reunion.10
As of 2010-2011, non-Arab countries host 
much smaller numbers of Egyptian migrants, of 
diverse profiles. The distribution of “permanent” 
Egyptian migrants by age group shows the 
predominance of those aged beyond 25. In 
Australia, North America and the UK, their 
age distribution suggests decades-old migration 
trends. Those based in Australia, especially, 
tend to be older: more than half (54 percent) 
of Egyptian migrants are aged 55 and above. In 
“crafts and related trades workers” (respectively 
23 and 15 percent).19 
Egypt also hosts refugees20 and asylum seekers.21 
The country is a signatory to the 1951 Refugee 
Convention and its 1967 Protocol, and the 1969 
OAU Convention. Nevertheless, as the country 
has not yet developed national asylum procedures 
and institutions, UNHCR carries functional 
responsibilities for all aspects of registration, 
documentation and refugee status determination 
(RSD) under the 1954 memorandum of 
understanding with the Government of Egypt. 
An estimated 70,000 Palestinian refugees came 
to Egypt as a result of the Israeli wars of 1948 
and 1967. Initially welcome, since 1982 they are 
considered as foreigners. They have hence lost 
their right to residency, the right to own property 
and work granted to them under Nasser’s Pan-
Arabist policies.
In general, accurate figures of foreign residents in 
Egypt are not available, as many foreign nationals 
reside and work irregularly. Many refugees 
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Europe, most Egyptians reside in Italy. They tend 
to be young: almost half of them – 48 percent – 
are between 25 and 44 years of age.
Men vastly outnumber women (192 men for 
100 women on average) and most Egyptians 
in Italy have a low education level: the highly-
educated only go to make up 25 percent of the 
migrants.11 This indicates the predominance of 
young, low-skilled workers. Italy also received 
families with dependents: 12 percent of migrants 
are in the 0-14 age group, more than elsewhere 
in the Western immigration countries. In the US 
and the UK, Egyptian migrants are often highly 
educated, respectively, 68 and 75 percent of the 
25-34 age group for instance. Therefore, these are 
likely to be in tertiary education, or young highly-
skilled professionals. The gender structure is also 
more balanced there than in Southern Europe: 
between 115 and 138 males for 100 women in the 
UK and North America. 
too, have not been registered by UNHCR. The 
Sudanese, for example, have had historic ties with 
Egypt and they enjoyed visa-free entry until 1995. 
They are usually employed in informal economic 
activities and thus remain largely undetected. 
Others found refuge in Egypt in the civil wars 
since 1955, among which the Darfur conflict, 
ongoing since 2003, or refuge from economic 
hardships. Of course, not all are recorded: there 
are thought to be several tens of thousands, some 
estimates reaching 500,000.22 
Conversely, refugees from Iraq who came to 
Egypt in the mid-2000s, in the aftermath of the 
collapse of Saddam Hussein’s regime and the 
ensuing sectarian conflicts were overestimated. A 
survey carried out in 2008 suggested the number 
of Iraqi refugees stood at 16,853, a figure that 
is much lower than the 100,000-150,000 often 
claimed.23 
Flows
Egypt is also a destination for refugees from 
Somalia, Eritrea, Ethiopia and from other Sub-
Saharan countries. Beside Egypt’s comparatively 
stable political situation until the 2011 revolution, 
the country is also a major regional hub for 
international aid bodies (UNHCR) and NGOs. It 
is also a transit country for refugees on their way 
to Europe, who often find themselves stranded in 
Egypt due to the closure of EU’s borders. African 
migrants also cross Egypt to reach Israel. 
After violence erupted in Libya in February 2011, 
UNHCR reported that close to 475,000 people 
entered Egypt through the Salloum border 
crossing. These included Egyptian returnees and 
Libyans, as well as third-country nationals and 
refugees who had been resident in Libya. It is 
estimated that most Libyans returned soon after.
To date, Syrians form the largest group of 
registered refugees in Egypt, who joined relatives 
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Flows
During the 2000s, flows of Egyptian migrants to 
the Gulf were steady, owing to a hike in oil prices 
after 2003: this hike stimulated new structural 
investments and spurred work force needs. 
The financial crisis of the late 2000s only 
moderately affected net inflows of Egyptians to 
the Gulf, for instance to Saudi Arabia. They even 
increased slightly in 2012, as regime change in 
Egypt and war in Libya reoriented and sustained 
flows to the Gulf. However, crackdowns on 
irregular workers became more regular in all Gulf 
countries. During 2013, a massive regularization 
campaign was followed by waves of expulsions 
of undocumented labourers from Saudi Arabia: 
these included 300,000 Egyptians in irregular 
situation. 
Many Egyptians had also to return from Libya, 
after the fall of Muammar Gadhafi’s regime. Then, 
re-entering became difficult as new measures 
were enacted on 1 January 2012. The Libyan 
National Transitional Council repealed the 
former agreements of free circulation between 
or came in search of cheaper housing and living 
costs than could be found in Jordan or Lebanon. 
Indeed, a sample survey indicated that the 
majority of Syrians in Egypt had first transited 
through Lebanon.24 Initially, Syrian refugees were 
also welcome under President Mursi’s regime. 
The Government of Egypt exempted Syrians 
(and the other Arab nationals) from entry visas. 
Syrians could enter on three-month-tourist visas 
and were directly registered by UNHCR.25
However, entry requirements changed in July 
2013, after General Sissi came to power. The 
government required procurement of a visa prior 
to arrival along with security clearance.26 Once 
their visas expire, Syrians are expected to register 
with the government. Amnesty International also 
reported cases of forcible deportation to Syria 
and other neighbouring countries in the region.27 
Entries have stalled since that date, as indicated 
in the movement of new registrations. Moreover, 
hostility toward resident Syrians became open 
and was fed, in part, by media campaigns. 
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the two countries and required that Egyptian 
workers obtain work visas before entering Libya. 
However, the dire economic situation in Egypt 
continued forcing migrants to Libya, where 
57,622 job opportunities were offered to Egyptian 
workers, in the last three months of 2013 alone.12 
Since 2014 and the deterioration of the security 
situation for Egyptians, no data is available as to 
how many Egyptians still commute between the 
two countries. 
Larger numbers of Egyptians have turned to 
Europe over the last two decades. Italy, especially, 
received 67 percent of all Egyptian first permit 
holders in Europe in 2010. However, legal flows 
of new migrants to that country (and elsewhere 
in Europe) have decreased since then. This is 
due mostly to a sharp drop in the number of 
first permits delivered to Egyptian nationals for 
the purpose of “remunerated activities”, in the 
aftermath of the financial crisis of 2008. 
This drop affected men in particular: the number 
of first permits granted to males fell from 11,270 
in 2010 to 4,433 in 2014. The workers among 
them dropped from 9,880 to 2,722 between the 
two dates. New women entrants displayed stable 
Palestinians from Syria face specific challenges in 
Egypt. They can enter if they have Syrian travel 
documents, but the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
has not allowed UNHCR to register them, and 
they have had difficulty renewing their visas. 
Consequently, many are arrested and detained, 
and even, in some cases, turned away at Cairo 
airport and sent back to Damascus. 
Egyptian authorities claim that the country hosts 
300,000 refugees from Syria. As of November 
2015, 123,585 Syrians were registered as refugees 
by UNHCR, down from a peak of 140,259 one 
year earlier, in November 2014.28 The vast majority 
of refugees from Syria are concentrated in urban 
neighbourhoods, primarily in the Greater Cairo 
area (62 percent), in Alexandria (20 percent) and 
in Damietta (8 percent). Their being scattered 
within local communities makes registration and 
services delivery a huge challenge. Moreover, 
refugees’ savings dry up and family assistance is 
strained. Newly arrived families also tend to be 
less affluent than the ones who came to Egypt 
before 2013.29 
Some refugees registered in Egypt are resettled in 
Western countries by international organisations, 
on humanitarian grounds.30 However, in view of 
the lack of immediate prospects in Egypt, Syrian 
and other refugees also try to reach Europe 
irregularly. In November 2015 alone, a total of 
3,635 refugees and migrants were arrested for 
attempting to depart Egypt irregularly by sea: 
this included 553 Syrians.31 Sudanese migrants 
go to make up a growing share of would-be 
migrants. According to detention data collected 
by UNHCR, more than 650 Sudanese refugees 
and asylum seekers were detained for trying 
to leave irregularly, in the first half of 2015, as 
compared with around 330 Syrians.32 
However, as police controls and repression over 
migrating by sea from Egypt are toughening, 
migration routes have diversified. Egypt could 
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figures (2,000 to 1,648 in 2014), almost all of 
them entering as family dependent (88 to 91 
percent over the same period). 
In the aftermath of Egypt’s regime change, and in 
spite of a recent reinforcement of police controls 
over migrant smuggling by sea, migration 
pressure continues to grow as the country’s 
economic slowdown takes effect. Consequently, 
increasing numbers of Egyptians seek to reach 
Europe illegally by boat, and especially to Italy 
where 4,000 Egyptians were received in 2015, 
according to IOM.13 
Among these are growing numbers of children 
without parents or guardians, or “unaccompanied 
minors”.14 In November 2015, the Egyptian 
Minister of Immigration and Expatriate Affairs 
declared that 3,000 Egyptian minors travelled 
alone to Italy in 2015, up from an estimated 2,000 
in 2014, according to IOM.15 Permits delivered 
to young boys in the 10-14 and 15-19 age groups 
went up for the category “Other reasons,” which 
includes the “unaccompanied minor” category.16 
Young Egyptians granted these permits were 154 
in 2010 (26 percent of all permits) and 722 in 
2014, 64 percent of all permits given to boys aged 
15-19.17 Girls that age, by contrast, come almost 
exclusively under “family reunion”.
become more of a transit than a final destination 
country as the Turkey to Balkan route, for 
instance, comes to be considered less dangerous 
and costly than the Egypt-Italy sea route.33 
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